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Abstract. Information provided by a source should be assessed by an
intelligent agent on the basis of several criteria: most notably, its con-
tent and the trust one has in its source. In turn, the observed quality of
information should feed back on the assessment of its source, and such
feedback should intelligently distribute among different features of the
source—e.g., competence and sincerity. We propose a formal framework
in which trust is treated as a multi-dimensional concept relativized to
the sincerity of the source and its competence with respect to specific
domains: both these aspects influence the assessment of the information,
and also determine a feedback on the trustworthiness degree of its source.
We provide a framework to describe the combined effects of competence
and sincerity on the perceived quality of information. We focus on the
feedback dynamics from information quality to source evaluation, high-
lighting the role that uncertainty reduction and social comparison play
in determining the amount and the distribution of feedback.
1 Introduction
In real life, the trust assigned to a message depends crucially, albeit not solely,
on the perceived trustworthiness of its source [11, 12]. In turn, whether or not the
message turns out to be reliable has important repercussions on the source trust-
worthiness. This is also true with respect to the exchange of arguments in social
interaction. When people argue with each other, trying to get their arguments
accepted to foster their own goals, they also evaluate the arguments proposed
by other parties in the discussion. This evaluation considers not only the pos-
sible conflicts with other arguments, but also the trustworthiness degree of the
information source proposing the arguments. In argumentation theory [24], the
arguments are considered to be accepted or not depending on the attacks against
them. In this kind of frameworks, neither the information sources proposing the
arguments nor their trustworthiness degree are considered. In recent years, the
area has seen a number of proposals [23, 25, 17, 22, 29, 5] to introduce the trust
component in the evaluation process of the arguments. One common drawback
of these attempts is that they do not return the intrinsic complexity of the trust
notion, as highlighted instead by socio-cognitive models, as well as by several
computational approaches to trust [1, 19, 18, 11, 12, 27].
In this paper, we adopt the socio-cognitive model of trust proposed by Castel-
franchi and Falcone [3], and we elaborate its computational counterpart, al-
though with some expressivity limitations due to the overall complexity of the
model. We are interested in investigating how that socio-cognitive model of trust
can be extended to a model based on argumentation. This breaks down into the
following sub-questions:
– How to distinguish different dimensions of trust, e.g., sincerity and compe-
tence, and model their respective contribution?
– How to model the trust feedback from arguments to information sources?
The latter issue is where we aim to make an original contribution to the
literature. We address these questions starting from the argumentation-based
model for belief revision recently proposed by da Costa Pereira et al. [5], which
originally lacked a representation of a cognitive model of trust and its inherent
dynamics. We also limit our analysis to trust in agents as information sources,
based on their track-record of delivering correct information, and with no regard
for whether or not they are trustworthy in other types of activity. While this
limited focus is justifiable in principle (John may be unreliable as a driver, and
yet be perfectly trustworthy when it comes to informing me about traffic), it is
also somewhat artificial, since even in exchanging information the features of the
communicative action that are relevant for trusting the agent are not limited to
the quality of the information being delivered (e.g., intentions also play a key
role). This fact is explicitly addressed by socio-cognitive models of trust, as well
as by other approaches to this topic [13]. However, the rationale for us to start
small will become apparent in the rest of the paper, and further development of
the framework is possible but left for future work. With respect to [5], we extend
that model along the following lines.
First, trust is not a monolithic concept: thus we relativize the notion of trust
to the dimensions of sincerity and competence in various domains. For instance,
a reliable motor mechanic will be considered competent in the cars domain, but
not necessarily so when suggesting the best restaurant to eat pizza; conversely,
a pizza maker is typically assumed to be trustworthy on the latter domain but
not on the former. The trust in the information source is not absolute, but it
is relative to an estimate of sincerity and competence in the relevant domain.
Sincerity and competence thus combine to produce an aggregated degree of trust.
Second, trust is not a static concept, since there is a bidirectional link between
the source and its information items. This means that an argument is more or
less believable on the basis of the source’s trustworthiness, but this leads to a
feedback such that the invalidation of the argument, due to attacks by other
trustworthy arguments, may feed back on the source’s credibility. The sign of
the feedback depends on how much the “quality” of the message surprises the
agent w.r.t. its prior assessment of the source trustworthiness.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the main differences
of our approach with related work, Section 3 provides the basic concepts of the
model proposed by Pereira et al. [5], Sections 4 and 5 introduce the multidimen-
sional trust model and specify the feedback mechanism, and the Conclusions end
the paper.
2 Related Work
The importance of relating trust and argumentation has been underlined by Dix
et al. [7], who present trust as a major issue concerning the research challenges
for argumentation. Also Parsons et al. [21] present the provenance of trust as
one of the mechanisms to be investigated in argumentation. They claim that
a problem, particularly of abstract approaches such as Dung [9], is that they
cannot express the provenance of trust, and the fact that b is attacked because b
is proposed by agent s who is not trustworthy. Starting from this observation, we
propose a model of argumentation where the arguments are related to the sources
and their degree of acceptability is computed on the basis of the trustworthiness
degree of the sources. Furthermore, our approach goes beyond this observation
by providing a feedback such that the final quality of the arguments influences
the source evaluation as well. Since it is based on abstract argumentation [9],
our proposal is currently limited to deductively valid arguments: extensions to
other forms of validity are certainly possible, but left to future work.
Most studies in this domain used argumentation to model trust dynamics
and/or reasoning about trust (e.g., [23, 17, 25, 29]), which is a worthy but differ-
ent enterprise from the one pursued here. Closer in spirit to the present paper
is the work by Parsons et al. [26, 22], who present a framework to introduce the
sources in argumentation and to express the degrees of trust (for an updated
review of both ways of linking trust and argumentation, see [14]). They define
trust-extended argumentation graphs in which each premise, inference rule, and
conclusion is associated to the trustworthiness degree of the source proposing it.
Thus, given two arguments rebutting each other, the argument whose conclusion
has a higher trust value is accepted. The difference is that in such a framework
the trust values associated to the arguments do not change and the arguments
are accepted with the same degree even if they are attacked by more trusted
arguments. Again, the feedback towards the source as well as the distinction
between competence and sincerity is not considered.
A huge amount of research has been conducted on trust, and some of these
works are described below, even if in this paper we limit our attention to the
cognitive trust model of Castelfranchi and Falcone [3]. An approach to model
trust using modal logic is proposed by Lorini and Demolombe [16], who present
a concept of trust that integrates the trusters goal, the trustees action ensuring
the achievement of the trusters goal, and the trustees ability and intention to
do this action—taking again inspiration from [3]. Another proposal is presented
by Liau [15], in which the influence of trust on the assimilation of information
into the source’s mind is considered. The idea is that “if agent i believes that
agent j has told him the truth on p, and he trusts the judgement of j on p, then
he will also believe p”. Wang and Singh [31], instead, understand trust in terms
of belief and certainty: A’s trust in B is reflected in the strength of A’s belief
that B is trustworthy. They formulate certainty in terms of evidence based on a
statistical measure defined over a probability distribution of positive outcomes.
Both Liau [15] and Wang and Singh [31] capture intuitions that play a role also
in our approach, but they oversimplify the nature and dynamics of trust, as
opposed to the socio-cognitive model discussed in Castelfranchi and Falcone [3].
Finally, an important body of work has investigated the interplay between
trust and reputation [1, 19, 18, 27], often in relation to argumentation as well [14].
Although definitions tend to vary across approaches and authors, trust is typ-
ically seen as an individual measure of confidence that a given agent has over
other agent(s), whereas reputation is a social measure of confidence that a group
of agents or a society has over agents or groups, usually assessed by looking at
how certain evaluations are spread and circulated in a given community [4].
While we consider the interplay between reputation and trust a key topic of re-
search, in this paper we will avoid addressing reputational mechanisms, because
our main aim is to discuss feedback dynamics from message quality to trustwor-
thiness evaluations. It is entirely possible that there are also interesting feedback
dynamics from argument quality to reputation values, but they are unlikely to be
as straightforward as those based on trust (precisely because trust is a more in-
dividual notion), and in any case dealing with feedback dynamics for reputation
would constitute a different research project. More generally, trust computation
here is relevant only to provide a formal background to illustrate some ideas on
feedback dynamics: if such ideas will turn out to be valuable, then we believe it
would be useful to apply them also to other, richer trust formalisms.
3 Background
A classical propositional language may be used to represent information for
manipulation by a cognitive agent.
Definition 1. (Language) Let Prop be a finite set of atomic propositions and
let L be the propositional language such that Prop∪{⊤,⊥} ⊆ L, and, ∀φ, ψ ∈ L,
¬φ ∈ L, φ ∧ ψ ∈ L, φ ∨ ψ ∈ L.
As usual, one may define additional logical connectives and consider them as
useful shorthands for combinations of connectives of L, e.g., φ ⊃ ψ ≡ ¬φ∨ψ. We
denote by Ω = {0, 1}Prop the set of all interpretations on Prop. An interpretation
I ∈ Ω is a function I : Prop→ {0, 1} assigning a truth value pI to every atomic
proposition p ∈ Prop and, by extension, a truth value φI to all formulas φ ∈ L.
We denote by [φ] the set of all models of φ, [φ] = {I : I |= φ}.
A Dung’s abstract argumentation framework [9] (AF ) is a pair 〈A,→〉 where
A is a set of elements called arguments and →⊆ A × A is a binary relation
called attack. Dung defines a number of acceptability semantics [9] to assess
which are the sets of accepted arguments. We can give arguments a structure,
and the attack relation is defined in terms of such a structure of the arguments:
an argument is a pair A = 〈Φ, φ〉, with φ ∈ L and Φ ⊂ L, such that (i) Φ 0 ⊥,
(ii) Φ ⊢ φ, (iii) Φ is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion. We call φ the conclusion and Φ
the support of the argument. Given A ∈ A, src(A) is the set of the sources of A.
In a recent paper, da Costa Pereira et al. [5] propose a framework where ar-
gumentation theory is used in belief revision. In this framework, the arguments
are weighted on the basis of the trustworthiness degree of the agents proposing
them. The acceptability of the arguments is then computed by a labelling al-
gorithm which assigns the arguments a fuzzy value, differently from Dung-like
frameworks where arguments are either accepted or rejected. We select this work
as the basis of our trust model because it provides (i) an explicit link between
the trustworthiness degree of the sources and of the arguments, (ii) a mecha-
nism such that the initial value assigned to the arguments changes due to the
attacks against them, (iii) the beliefs of the agents are also involved, not only
their arguments.
Given an AF and the trust degree τs of each source s, the labeling algo-
rithm [5] computes a fuzzy extension as a fuzzy set of accepted arguments,
whose membership α assigns to each argument A a degree of acceptability α(A)
such that α(A) = 0 means the argument is outright unacceptable, α(A) = 1
means the argument is fully acceptable, and all cases inbetween are provided
for. Then the labeling α is used to determine the agent’s beliefs, by constructing
a possibility distribution from which the degree of belief of an arbitrary formula
may be calculated.
A possibility distribution may be defined as the membership function of a
fuzzy set that describes the more or less possible and mutually exclusive values
of one (or more) variable(s) [32]. Indeed, if F designates the fuzzy set of possible
values of a variable X, piX = µF is called the possibility distribution associated
to X. The identity µF (v) = piX(v) means that the membership degree of v to F
is equal to the possibility degree of X being equal to v when all we know about
X is that its value is in F . A possibility distribution for which there exists a
completely possible value (∃v0 : pi(v0) = 1) is said to be normalized.
Definition 2. (Possibility and Necessity Measures) A possibility distribution pi
induces a possibility measure and its dual necessity measure, denoted by Π and
N respectively. Both measures apply to a crisp set A and are defined as follows:
Π(A) = sup
s∈A
pi(s); (1)
N(A) = 1−Π(A¯) = inf
s∈A¯
{1− pi(s)}. (2)
In words, the possibility measure of A corresponds to the greatest of the pos-
sibilities associated to its elements; conversely, the necessity measure of A is
equivalent to the impossibility of its complement A¯.
The beliefs of an agent are thus completely described by a normalized possi-
bility distribution pi : Ω → [0, 1], which represents a plausibility order of possible
states of affairs: pi(I) is the possibility degree of interpretation I.
Given A = 〈Φ, φ〉, let con(A) denote the conclusion of A, i.e., con(〈Φ, φ〉) = φ.
The possibility distribution pi induced by a fuzzy labeling α is constructed by
letting, for all interpretation I,
pi(I) = min{1, 1 + max
A:I|=con(A)
α(A)− max
B:I6|=con(B)
α(B)}, (3)
where the first maximum accounts for the most convincing argument compatible
with I, and the second maximum accounts for the most convincing argument
against I. A world is possible to an extent proportional to the difference between
the most convincing argument supporting it and the most convincing argument
against it. The world is considered completely possible if such difference is pos-
itive or null, but it is considered less and less possible (or plausible) as such
difference grows more and more negative.
The degree to which a given arbitrary formula φ ∈ L is believed is calculated
from the possibility distribution induced by the fuzzy argumentation framework
as B(φ) = N([φ]) = 1−maxI6|=φ{pi(I)}, where B may be regarded, at the same
time, as a fuzzy modal epistemic operator or as a fuzzy subset of L. Notice
that B(φ) can be computed for any formula φ, not just for formulas that are
the conclusion of some argument. E.g., if A is an argument whose conclusion
is p and B is an argument whose conclusion is p ⊃ q, and α(A) = α(B) = 1,
then not only B(p) = B(p ⊃ q) = 1, but also B(q) = 1, B(p ∧ q) = 1, etc.
Consequences of the properties of possibility and necessity measures are that
B(φ) > 0⇒ B(¬φ) = 0, which means that if the agent somehow believes φ then
it cannot believe ¬φ at all, and
B(⊤) = 1, (4)
B(⊥) = 0, (5)
B(φ ∧ ψ) = min{B(φ),B(ψ)}, (6)
B(φ ∨ ψ) ≥ max{B(φ),B(ψ)}. (7)
4 Trust model
In this section, we take a look into the multidimensional nature of trust. For the
sake of brevity, we simplify Castelfranchi and Falcone’s model [3], and focus only
on two broad categories of relevant features in the source: competence (to what
extent the source is deemed able to deliver a correct argument) and sincerity
(to what extent the source is considered willing to provide a correct argument),
both of which contribute to determine the source’s overall trustworthiness1. Im-
portantly, evaluations of competence and sincerity are allowed to change across
1 Sincerity and competence are not the only features required to assess the trustworthi-
ness of sources, so we propose to focus on them only as a useful first approximation.
Demolombe [6] emphasized the importance for a source to be not only correct (if
it asserts something, then that information is true), but also endowed with a com-
plete knowledge of a given domain (if something is true, the source is informed of it)
and willing to share such knowledge (if the source is informed of something, then it
shares that information with others). Moreover, it is also essential that the informa-
tion provided by the source is relevant for the receiver’s goals, and that the latter
different domains. For instance, a reliable doctor will be considered competent
in the health domain, but not necessarily so when suggesting the best restaurant
where to have dinner; conversely, a food critic is typically assumed to be trust-
worthy on the latter domain but not on the former; and so on. Similarly, I might
think that the colleague who is competing with me for a promotion is likely to
be insincere in giving me tips on how to improve my career, and yet there is no
reason to doubt his sincerity when he suggests me what movie to watch tonight.
Here, we consider competence and sincerity as two possible dimensions for
measuring the trustworthiness of a source. Such dimensions will be represented
as graded beliefs, that is, an agent believes, to a given degree, that a source
is competent (sincere) with respect to a domain. In order to represent the fact
that the agent’s beliefs can be incomplete (an agent may not have beliefs on
everything), it is important to make it clear that one may either “believe p”,
“believe ¬p”, or believe none of them, due to ignorance [8]. In such a case, it
must be possible to make the fact that B(p) = 0 and B(¬p) = 0 explicit. This
is the reason why the competence and sincerity will be represented by a bipolar
pair of beliefs, in competence (sincerity) and in the negation thereof.
The idea is that each source is assigned by the agent a belief of competence
and another belief of sincerity, both represented by bipolar values ranging be-
tween 0 and 1. These beliefs combine to determine the degree of trustworthiness.
What is crucial is that the basic properties of sincerity and competence are kept
separate, since the feedback will be designed to affect differently each of them,
and only as a consequence will also impact on the source’s aggregate trustwor-
thiness.
4.1 Modeling Competence
Here, the idea is to define a number of competence domains, with respect to
which: (i) the competence of a source s is evaluated, yielding the trust an agent
has in s when it offers arguments relevant to any domain—the trust in the
competence of s is a vector c(s) whose elements may be formally regarded as
bipolar degrees of belief 〈c+d , c
−
d 〉, where c
+
d is the degree to which the agent
believes the source is competent about domain d, and c−d is the degree to which
the agent believes the source is not competent about d2 (notice that competence
is binary and it is the belief which is graded); and (ii) the positive and negative
feedback reflected on the information source is also domain-specific, e.g., if the
doctor tells the agent to go to a restaurant that turns out to be bad, this reduces
the agent’s confidence in her gastronomic taste, not in her medical skills.
We propose to associate the arguments, by way of the formula in their conclu-
sion, to the competence domains depending on the topic their are talking about.
has reasons to trust the source not to deliver useless news, even if they happen to be
correct and complete (for discussion of trust in relevance, see [20]). Discussing these
further dimensions of information dynamics is left to future work.
2
c
+
d
and c−
d
obey the property, typical of necessities and beliefs, that c+
d
> 0 ⇒ c−
d
= 0
and, vice versa, c−
d
> 0 ⇒ c+
d
= 0.
The atomic propositions of the language are mapped to the competence domains
with a certain degree, i.e., the degree to which the atomic proposition belongs
in the specific domain. The degree to which a propositional formula (argument)
belongs in a specific domain might be given by the maximum degree to which
the atomic propositions on which the truth value of the formula depends belong
to the competence domain.
Definition 3. Given D the set of competence domains, and Prop the set of
atomic propositions, the association between atoms and domains, is represented
by a fuzzy relation R ⊆ D × Prop. Given p ∈ Prop, d ∈ D, the membership
degree of the atomic proposition p to domain d is R(d, p) ∈ [0, 1].
We now extend R of Definition 3 to D × L.
Definition 4. Let φ ∈ L be a propositional formula and d ∈ D be a competence
domain, then
R(d, φ) = max
p∈DS(φ)
R(d, p),
where DS(φ) = {p ∈ Prop : ∃I |= p, I ′ 6|= p : φI 6= φI
′
} is the determinant set
of φ, i.e., the set of all atomic propositions on which the truth of φ depends.
4.2 Modeling Sincerity
The notion of sincerity is a property typically attributed to agents with goals and
intentions. Talking about the sincerity of an information source is assuming that
source is another agent and has intentions, which can be in harmony or in conflict
with the goals of the recipient. For example, when I meet my bank’s personal
investment advisor to get advice on possible placements of my savings, I should
know from the outset that, among her goals, she has the one of maximizing the
profits of her employer. Therefore, I may expect that she will be tempted to
manipulate my beliefs to lure me into buying financial instruments on which the
bank makes a profit.
Furthermore, in general, the sincerity of a source should relate differently to
each individual domain: a malicious agent may have an advantage to lie about
a domain somehow related with its goals, but has no interest in lying about
unrelated domains. Therefore, it would be wrong to regard sincerity as an abso-
lute property of a source. Thus, both competence and sincerity are relativized
to individual domains.
Based on the above discussion, we will model the beliefs an agent maintains
about the sincerity of its sources as a vector σ(s), whose components, associated
to individual domains, are bipolar values 〈σ+d , σ
−
d 〉 where σ
+
d ∈ [0, 1] represents
the degree to which the agent has reasons to believe that source s is sincere about
d, whereas σ−d ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree to which the agent has reasons to
believe the contrary (again, sincerity is treated as a binary notion, and what is
graded here are the beliefs); σ+d = σ
−
d represents a status of maximal uncertainty
about the sincerity of s about d. Since σ+d and σ
−
d represent beliefs, they must
satisfy all properties of beliefs, in particular that σ+d > 0 ⇒ σ
−
d = 0 and σ
−
d >
0⇒ σ+d = 0.
4.3 Aggregating Competence and Sincerity
Competence and sincerity may be aggregated into a single trust value τd, used to
weight arguments, by recalling that both concepts are formally beliefs, although
of a special kind, not induced by the agent’s AF , but determined by the internal
mechanisms of competence and sincerity evaluation.
In particular, one might argue that a source is trusted to the extent that it
is believed to be both competent and sincere. If this is the intended meaning of
trust, then, for all domains d, the degree to which s is trusted about d is given
by
τd(s) = B(competent(d, s) ∧ sincere(d, s))
= min(B(competent(d, s)),B(sincere(d, s))),
where competent(d, s) means that s is competent about d and sincere(d, s) means
that s is sincere about d.
This belief degree may be computed by reconstructing the possibility distri-
bution pi that induces the beliefs
B(competent(d, s)) = c+d ,
B(¬competent(d, s)) = c−d ,
B(sincere(d, s)) = σ+d ,
B(¬sincere(d, s)) = σ−d .
There are four possible worlds, as far as the competence and sincerity of source
s about d goes, namely
I0 = competent(d, s)) ∧ sincere(d, s)),
I1 = competent(d, s)) ∧ ¬sincere(d, s)),
I2 = ¬competent(d, s)) ∧ sincere(d, s)),
I3 = ¬competent(d, s)) ∧ ¬sincere(d, s)).
Let us abbreviate pi(Ii) as pii. Since we know that
max{pi0, pi1} = 1− c
−
d ,
max{pi2, pi3} = 1− c
+
d ,
max{pi0, pi2} = 1− σ
−
d ,
max{pi1, pi3} = 1− σ
+
d ,
we may solve this system of four equations for the four unknown variables
pi0, pi1, pi2, pi4 to get
pi0 = 1−max{c
−
d , σ
−
d },
pi1 = 1−max{c
−
d , σ
+
d },
pi2 = 1−max{c
+
d , σ
−
d },
pi3 = 1−max{c
+
d , σ
+
d }.
Therefore, the single trust value for domain d is given by the conjunction of how
much the agent believes source s is competent and sincere concerning d
τd(s) = B(competent(d, s) ∧ sincere(d, s)) =
= 1−Π([¬competent(d, s) ∨ ¬sincere(d, s)]) =
= 1−max{pi1, pi2, pi3} =
= min{max{c−d , σ
+
d },max{c
+
d , σ
−
d },max{c
+
d , σ
+
d }}.
5 Feedback Dynamics
In this section, we define the feedback dynamics on the sources. As we discussed
in the previous sections, the acceptability of the arguments in our model depends
on (i) the trustworthiness of the information source proposing the arguments,
and (ii) the interactions of the proposed arguments and the other beliefs of
the agent. What we want to introduce in this section is the idea that the final
acceptability value of the arguments provides a feedback on the trustworthiness
degree in the information source from the next interaction.
5.1 Overall Feedback: The role of prediction and surprise
The overall amount and sign (increment or decrement) of the feedback depends
on how much the overall quality of the message surprises the agent, with respect
to its prior assessment of the source trustworthiness. This captures the principle
that information quality should change one’s assessment of its source only when
the agent learns something new about the capacity of the source to deliver infor-
mation of either high or low quality. In other words, there should be a feedback
on the source only when the quality of its argument tells me something new
about the source’s trustworthiness, revealing my previous opinion to be wrong.
Otherwise, the quality of the new argument just confirms my previous assess-
ment of the source, and confirmation, by definition, consolidates a pre-existing
judgment, rather than modifying it. This points to the role of prediction in feed-
back dynamics from arguments to sources, and this prediction is based on the
pre-existing degree of trustworthiness of the source of a given argument.
Let τ(s) be the current degree of trustworthiness of source s and B(con(A))
the degree of belief, in light of current evidence, in argument A provided by s3.
Assuming that argument quality Q(A) is given by B(con(A)), then the total
amount of feedback FA produced by argument A on source s is given by
FA = Q(A)− τ(s). (8)
The overall feedback FA in our framework ranges between −1 (utter dis-
appointment) and +1 (wonderful surprise), and goes to 0 whenever source s
provides an argument A whose quality is exactly as expected (Q(A) = τ(s)).
3 con(A) represent the conclusion of argument A.
This straightforward characterization of feedback relies on the simplifying as-
sumption that the agent has a previous assessment of all possible sources, so
that τ(s) = 0 indicates absolute distrust rather than complete ignorance on
the source trustworthiness. Expanding the framework to handle the important
difference between distrust and ignorance is left for future work.
The critical point we tackle here is that this feedback might affect to a dif-
ferent extent the two components of trustworthiness, to wit, competence and
sincerity, depending on the agent’s interpretation of what determined it. Feed-
back on sources is often specific: the agent does not only register the fact that
the source provided information of good (or bad) quality, but it also diagnoses
what virtue (or vice) prompted the source to do so. For instance, when I find
out that a trusted source provided a poor piece of advice, should I conclude that
the source was being deliberately insincere, or should I attribute the incident
to a lack of competence? The overall trustworthiness is lowered in either case,
but for very different reasons. Conversely, when a poorly estimated source pro-
vides surprisingly good information, is this because it stopped deceiving me, or
because it became more competent?
5.2 Feedback Distribution: Uncertainty reduction and social
comparison
Feedback dynamics face the problem of how to distribute the overall feedback FA
between competence and sincerity. In this respect, our current formal framework
faces an important limitation: there is no way to access semantically the source’s
beliefs and goals, so they cannot be invoked to justify the different diagnoses the
agent could make of information quality—contrary to what happens in real life,
as discussed in [3]. For example, if I attribute to source s a goal which is currently
in conflict with my own, any poor quality information I receive from s is more
likely to be imputed to dishonesty than incompetence. In view of this limitation,
the best we can do is to use smart rules-of-thumb that capture interesting (albeit
partial) feedback regularities, leaving to future work further refinements on this
point.
We propose two independent principles, whose effects sum up in distributing
the feedback between competence and sincerity.
The first principle focuses on the individual’s previous assessment of a specific
source, whereas the second principle compares what the single source is saying
to what other sources said, and uses this degree of convergence to shape the
feedback distribution.
The first principle might be labelled uncertainty reduction: the idea is that
a feedback should affect more the dimension for which there is greater un-
certainty, that is, such that Uc = 1 − max{c
+, c−}, for competence, or Uσ =
1 − max{σ+, σ−}, for sincerity, is greater. This works well for cases where the
agent has formed a clear judgment on one dimension but is in doubt on the
other: if I am convinced of your honesty but do not know whether you are com-
petent or not (or vice versa), then the quality of your argument is likely to be
interpreted as evidence for or against your competence (or honesty)—after all,
that is what I was not sure about to start with.
Given the total amount of feedback FA from argument A, let c = 〈c
+, c−〉
be the prior beliefs in competence, σ = 〈σ+, σ−〉 be the prior beliefs in sincerity,
and FA(c) and FA(σ) the amount of feedback assigned to, respectively, c and σ.
Then the following rule is used to capture the principle of uncertainty reduction:
FA(c) =
FAUc
Uc + Uσ
, FA(σ) =
FAUσ
Uc + Uσ
. (9)
This formulation satisfies the following desirable properties: (i) FA(c)+FA(σ) =
FA, (ii) Uc > Uσ ⇒ |FA(c)| > |FA(σ)|, (iii) Uc < Uσ ⇒ |FA(c)| < |FA(σ)|, and
(iv) Uc = Uσ ⇒ FA(c) = FA(σ) =
1
2FA.
The second principle might be labeled social comparison: the idea is to com-
pute the degree of convergence of an argument, measured as the number of
sources that present that argument or arguments that support it, minus all the
sources that are proposing arguments in contrast with it. Then convergence and
quality of argument A are compared to determine what dimension of trustwor-
thiness is more affected by the feedback, as follows:
(i) if A is good and convergent, there is a stronger positive feedback on sincerity
than on competence (each source vouches for the sincerity of the other, even
if they should all turn out to be mistaken);
(ii) if A is good and divergent, there is a stronger positive feedback on competence
than on sincerity (an isolated source going against popular wisdom is likely
to be on to something, like the biblical vox clamantis in deserto);
(iii) if A is poor and convergent, there is a stronger negative feedback on compe-
tence than on sincerity (it is unlikely that everybody is conspiring to fool
you, whereas it is more plausible that they are all honestly mistaken);
(iv) if A is poor and divergent, there is a stronger negative feedback on sincer-
ity than on competence (this is the typical case of a malicious or derailed
source)4.
More precisely, let ProA be the number of sources claiming argument A or sup-
porting it and ConA be the number of sources attacking argument A. Then we
measure the degree of convergence kA for A as follows:
kA =
ProA − ConA
ProA +ConA
. (10)
4 Note that these principles are based on a number of assumptions (most notably,
high level of independence and low probability of collusion among sources), and thus
are not meant to be universally valid. Rather, they exemplify how simple rules-of-
thumb can be identified to regulate feedback distribution, even without any explicit
representation of context or agent’s mental states. Testing their validity across var-
ious communicative situations (e.g., how much collusion is required to make these
heuristics ineffective?) is left as future work.
In the limiting case, when there is no source either supporting or attacking A,
this indicates that the argument has no external source, hence convergence does
not apply. Otherwise, kA always ranges between 1 (only supporting sources)
and −1 (only attacking sources), with the 0 value indicating instances where the
same number of sources support and attack A. Then the following rule is used
to capture the principle of social comparison:
– if kA > 0 and FA > 0 (convergent argument producing a positive feedback),
then the positive product kAFA(c) is added to FA(σ) and subtracted from
FA(c).
– if kA < 0 and FA > 0 (divergent argument producing a positive feedback),
then the positive product kAFA(σ) is added to FA(c) and subtracted from
FA(σ).
– if kA > 0 and FA < 0 (convergent argument producing a negative feedback),
then the negative product kAFA(σ) is added to FA(c) and subtracted from
FA(σ).
– if kA < 0 and FA < 0 (divergent argument producing a negative feedback),
then the negative product kAFA(c) is added to FA(σ) and subtracted from
FA(c).
– finally, if kA = 0 (neither convergent nor divergent), then social comparison
has no effect on feedback distribution.
It is worth noting that the combination of both principles determines a dis-
tribution of the feedback between competence and sincerity that respects the
following constraints:
0 ≤ |FA(c)| ≤ |FA| and 0 ≤ |FA(σ)| ≤ |FA|. (11)
This states that distributing the feedback between competence and sincerity does
not change the overall amount of feedback. At most, all the feedback will apply
to only one dimension and not at all to the other: this happens, for instance,
when the argument is either completely convergent (kA = 1) or divergent (kA =
−1), but it never happens that the sum of the feedback on sincerity and the
feedback on competence exceeds the overall amount of feedback produced by
the argument. Moreover, the social comparison rules listed above also ensure
that the same argument will not generate a positive feedback on one dimension
and a negative feedback on the other one. This is consistent with basic intuitions
on how feedback dynamics ought to happen.
All in all, the system of rules described in this section provides a relatively
simple way to characterize feedback dynamics from information quality to source
evaluation, allowing to discriminate multiple dimensions of trustworthiness and
capturing some intuitions on how feedback should be distributed among them.
We certainly do not claim that these rules-of-thumb are perfect or immune to
counter-examples—quite the contrary. However, they strike us as a useful and
productive approximation of regularities in feedback dynamics, given current
formal limitations in providing a semantic link between context of interaction,
mental states (beliefs and goals) and argument assessment.
5.3 Feedback Application
We now have all the elements required to define how the feedback produced by
argument A on source s is applied to the vectors c(s) and σ(s).
For the sake of generality, let us denote by 〈x+, x−〉 the bipolar degrees that
must be updated, by f the relevant dimension of feedback, and by 〈y+, y−〉 the
updated degrees. One may regard 〈x+, x−〉 as formally equivalent to a variable
x ∈ [−1, 1], defined as x = x+ − x−, such that
x+ =
{
x, if x > 0,
0 otherwise;
(12)
x− =
{
−x, if x < 0,
0 otherwise.
(13)
Now, the problem of updating the bipolar degrees of belief 〈c+d , c
−
d 〉 with the
competence dimension of feedback FA(c) and 〈σ
+
d , σ
−
d 〉 with the sincerity dimen-
sion of feedback FA(σ) may be approached by mapping the bipolar degrees to
the single variable x = x+ − x− and compute
y =
{
x+ (1− x) · f, if f ≥ 0,
x+ (1 + x) · f, if f < 0,
(14)
from which 〈y+, y−〉may be obtained by means of Equations 12 and 13. Feedback
on competence and sincerity of s about d will be obtained by
F dA(c) = FA(c) ·R(d, con(A)), (15)
F dA(σ) = FA(σ) ·R(d, con(A)). (16)
Equations 15 and 16 amount to a projection of either dimension of the feedback
along the domains related to the proposed argument, so that only the competence
and sincerity about those domains are affected by the feedback.
6 Conclusions
Building on the socio-cognitive model of trust described in [3] and on previous
work integrating trust, argumentation and belief revision [5], in this paper we
presented a formal framework for modeling how different dimensions of the per-
ceived trustworthiness of the source interact to determine the expected quality
of the message, and how deviations from such expectation produce a specific
feedback on source trustworthiness. In particular, we characterize competence
and sincerity as the key ingredients of trustworthiness, and model both as be-
ing domain-dependent. Competence and trustworthiness determine an evalua-
tion of trustworthiness for the source, which in turn produces an expectation
on the quality of its arguments. Whenever an argument violates the recipient’s
expectation on quality, this produces a feedback on its source—positive if the
argument was better than expected, negative if it was worse. Depending on sev-
eral criteria (most notably, uncertainty reduction and social comparison), this
feedback is distributed among the two key dimensions of trustworthiness, to wit,
competence and sincerity. Our model allows to detect the reasons behind the
trustworthiness degree assigned to a source in a fine-gained way, and it is useful
in such applications where the agents cannot simply avoid the interaction with
the untrustworthy sources but they have to reason about trust.
Here, we applied this model to the case of agents exchanging and assessing
arguments, but it could easily be extended to the exchange of any kind of factual
information. The reason why we focused first on argumentation is because this
provides a window on the agent’s reasoning and the resulting process of belief
change. This did not play a major role in the present paper, but it would be
essential for most extensions of the model: for instance, to study how sources
typically exchange information neither randomly nor out of mere kindness, but
rather aiming at strategic changes in the recipient’s beliefs and goals, to better
serve the source’s own agenda.
However, arguments in this paper were treated basically as black boxes, as
it is most often the case in works based on abstract argumentation, in the vein
of [9]. This is significant in two respects. First, we did not discuss the two-
way relationship between source trustworthiness and trust in the message when
what is being communicated is not the argument as a whole, but rather one of
its constituents, e.g., a premise, its conclusion, or the inference rule licensing the
argument, as in [22]. Finding out that the source is mistaken on the truth of
some premise (hence the argument is unsound) rather than on the truth of the
inference (hence the argument is invalid) is likely to have very different effects
for the feedback on the source, which will have to be investigated in future work.
Second, the internal structure of arguments in [5] is limited to deductively valid
arguments, again as it is customary in abstract argumentation after Dung [9].
This is a huge idealization with respect to everyday argumentation: as informal
logicians and argumentation theorists never tire to repeat [30], we rarely, if ever,
exchange deductively valid arguments, while the vast majority of arguments are
defeasible, which implies a different sort of consequence relation.
Besides, sources often communicate explicitly the intended degree of strength
of their arguments, thus expressing qualified reservations either on their sound-
ness (the premise might be false) or on their validity (the inference might not
always work)—see Toulmin’s notion of qualifier [28]. What matters to us is that
such qualification impacts both on argument assessment and on feedback dy-
namics: a very tentative argument which is given as such carries less weight in
determining my beliefs, and at the same time its source is protected (partially
or even completely) from negative feedback—after all, if it fails, that was explic-
itly countenanced by its source, so no blame needs to be assigned. Even more
subtly, qualified arguments might induce very peculiar feedback, and not just
insulate the source from criticism. Imagine I tell you that argument A makes
a very feeble case for p: it carries some weight, but not much. Then you find
out on your own not only that p was indeed the case, but also that A was a
crucial argument to prove it. Now you have reason to criticize me as a source,
not because the argument I gave you was defective, but on the contrary because
I underestimated its quality while presenting it. As in the standard case, here
you can think that I was honestly mistaken or deceptive, depending on several
considerations. None of this can be investigated by sticking to deductively valid
arguments, so future work will need to apply this approach also to (internally)
defeasible arguments.
Moreover, at present the framework does not capture the cumulative effect
of converging sources on argument acceptability, or the effect of converging ar-
guments on belief strength; instead, we use the maximum trustworthiness value
among all the sources of an argument, and we do something similar for arguments
converging on the same conclusion. This is acceptable in light of all the other
issues addressed in this paper, and to comply with length constraints. However,
when more than one source offer the same argument or piece of information,
its acceptability is positively affected, even if the trustworthiness assigned to
the additional sources is not especially high, as discussed in [2]. Conversely, the
feedback from the message to the messenger might also depend on how many
messengers were making that particular claim, and how much trusted each of
them were to start with. Sharing the blame for a bad argument, or the credit for
a good one, might reduce the overall feedback in ways that are not countenanced
by the current framework, since at present the degree of convergence/divergence
is used only to distribute the feedback between credibility and sincerity.
Other limitations concern constraints implicitly imposed upon sources and
how they interact with the evaluating agent. For instance, countenancing the
possibility of sources providing information on other sources would open the way
to fruitful integration of our approach with reputation models, as it is indeed
customary in the literature on trust (see for instance [1, 19, 18, 27]). Also, so
far the agent who has to assess source trustworthiness is just a passive receiver
of information, whereas it would be of great interest to study how trust can
guide active queries to sources (as it is done in [10]), and whether the fact
that the source is responding to a query or spontaneously providing information
makes any difference in feedback dynamics—as we suspect it might. In this
context, another key dimension yet to consider is the relevance of the information
provided by sources, with respect to the goals of the querying agents: recently
Paglieri and Castelfranchi [20] discussed the role of trust in assessing source
quality also in terms of relevance, and provided preliminary suggestions on how
to include this further dimension in the model outlined in this paper.
Finally, the potential of the rule-of-thumbs discussed for feedback distribu-
tion has not yet been fully explored, since doing so will require implementing this
model into a running multi-agent simulation and experiment with it. Uncertainty
reduction and social comparison are not meant to capture empirical regularities
in feedback dynamics, but rather to describe some general key principles, whose
specific application to dialogical situations is bound to be context-dependent,
and thus should be investigated empirically. Several worthy research questions
could thus be addressed: What is the optimal level of uncertainty reduction, and
how does it depend on features of the dialogical environment? Under what con-
ditions (e.g., source independence and likelihood of collusion) social comparison
heuristics are most likely to be effective, and how can they be made more robust
against massive presence of malicious information sources and collusive dynam-
ics? Agent-based social simulation offers a promising methodology to address
these and other issues, hence the need to implement the model outlined in this
paper in future work.
In spite of these limitations, our approach has the important merit of pro-
viding a unified framework to represent the effects of source trustworthiness
on information assessment, and the converse impact of information quality on
source evaluation. This is the cornerstone of rational trust in communication: we
assess neither the messenger nor its message in isolation, but instead capitalize
on their mutual interdependence to obtain information on the trustworthiness of
both. On this simple foundation, many future studies may (and ought to) build.
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